Relation to Prominent Issues

[This (including the subpages) is material under development.]

The discussion of the Moral Realism/Non-Realism issue is vastly dominated by the consideration  and reconsideration of certain traditional arguments and issues. These include, in particular, the 'Is'/Ought' divide adumbrated by D. Hume in the Treatise of Human Nature (1739), the 'naturalistic fallacy' adumbrated by G.E. Moore in the Principia Ethica (1903), J.L. Mackie's arguments 'from queerness' and 'from diversity', proposed in Ethics—Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), and the debate, most prominent because of an exchange between D. Brink and M. Smith, about whether moral opinions do necessarily motivate (this position is called 'Internalism') or not ('Externalism'). Discussion of these issues considerably furthers the perceived significance of a meta-ethical text; yet at the same time, these issues are of extremely limited real significance for the matter itself; their consideration is chiefly due to useless name-dropping and the pretence of diligence. The links on the left hand side transport you to some comments meant to substantiate this admittedly rather sweeping judgement.

Notice that the purpose of these comments is in no case to answer the questions or solve the problems addressed, but rather, (a) to demonstrate that and why the objections under consideration are too unclear or too vague to be of primary relevance for the debate, or (b) to show that they are of limited significance when the truth of Moral Realism is defended according to the lines of the 'Swabian defence'.