The Argument

 

Step 1 -- The objective existence and pervasiveness of dis-value

 

1.1 -- The objective existence of psychic states like pleasure and suffering

 

As People experiencing pleasure and suffering, we know that pleasure and suffering exist. (Alluding to Descartes, we may put this in a brief argument: 'I suffer, therefore I am, and something suffers'.)

 

1.2 -- The objective (dis-)valuability of psychic states like pleasure and suffering

 

Some psychic states are either valuable or dis-valuable. Using suffering, which is dis-valuable, we can construe (what may be called) a “hypothetical world parts (HWP) test” aimed at the existence of objective dis-value. 

 

HWP-1: A being dies, suffering deeply.
HWP-2: The being dies without any suffering.

 

The question is, Can we say that it is quite immaterial whether HWP 1 is realized, or HWP 2 instead (other things unconsidered)? The answer is, clearly, no. A world in which HWP-1 is realized would be worse (other things unconsidered). The obvious reason is that HWP-1 is more undesirable than HWP-2 (other things unconsidered).

 

It is apparently not the case that HWP-2 is in itself desirable. So given that HWP-1 is less desirable in comparison, it must be (absolutely) undesirable. The obvious reason is that it comprises suffering. Thus, suffering is undesirable. Since suffering is realized in the world, undesirable states exist (objectively, i.e., roughly, independently of anyone 'believing in' its existence). (Subtle arguments to the effect that our experiences of suffering may be illusory face the objection that this kind of illusion is tantalising enough to instantiate undesirability.)

 

Given that suffering is undesireable in the way it is, being in a state of suffering as such is dis-valuable. Since suffering is realized in the world, dis-value exists (in the characteristic way in which properties exist, viz., by virtue of being realized by bearers; and objectively, i.e., roughly, independently of anyone 'believing in' its existence). (This step is worth taking explicitly, given widespread skepticism concerning the existence of value/dis-value.) 

 

 

 

[...]

 

1.3 -- The vast distribution of objectively (dis-)valuable states 

 

There is a vast array of states which pass the HWP-test with the same outcome, mutatis mutandis, including pain, panic, depression, terror (dis-valuable), happiness, joy, comfort, and relief (valuable). Hence, there is a vast array of objectively (dis-)valuable states. (NB. This list only mentions psychic states; yet it is not intended to exclude the existence of other kinds of value or dis-value.)

 

1.4 -- Objectivity  of the existence of (dis-)valuable psychic states, and of their (dis-)value

 

Many are reluctant to accept the conclusion of the objectivity of the existence of (dis-)value. This reluctance, however, usually goes back to the neglect of certain distinctions. 

 

(a) The existence of 'subjective' phenomena is often doubted with reference to their being 'subjective'. This usually rests on a confusion of existing-as-property-of-a-subject and existing-only-according-to-the-views-of-a-subject-(or-subjects). The latter case surely fails to be a case of existing at all, yet the former case is crucially different. The existence of the dis-value of suffering does not depend on its being represented by a subject, or a group as existing. While suffering is in a sense subjective, its existence is not. 

 

(b) That those dis-valuable mental states are states of subjects does not mean they ‘exist but subjectively’. Some subjects exist objectively, and so do their states. (Incidentally, J.R. Searle’s distinction between ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ subjectivity sounds similar to (a) and (b), but is different and, incidentally, does not seem to concern the present problem dead-on.) 

 

(c) That the HWP test appeals to the intuitions of subjects (namely, us) does not imply that its target is subjective existence. When we actually assess HWP-2 as preferable-from-an-impartial-point-of-view, what we focus is the question of its objective preferability. (We may perhaps still be wrong; yet this is another issue.)

 

(d) That the HWP test appeals to the intuitions of subjects (namely, us) does not obliterate the argument aimed at, which is not meant to be a proof, but employs inductive evidence drawn from the opinion of experts: the argument presumes that people familiar with suffering are experts about that state. 

 

(e) Notice that the HWP-test targets a suffering’s being undesirable tout court (rather than ‘merely’ undesirable for the person suffering).

 

 

 

Step 2 -- Definitions

 

'Moral Realism' is defined as the claim that some moral facts (states, properties, entities) exist.

 

'Objectivist' Moral Realism' is defined as the claim that moral facts (states, properties, entities) exist objectively. (This is meant to delimit the present position from 'subjectivist' moral realism, according to which moral entities can be there 'non-objectively', and some moral entities do.) 

 

“Egoistic” is not particularly defined here; but it is assumed that while someone’s intending to realise p may imply that she wants p, it does not follow that her intention is egoistic.

 

(In the following partial explications, I consistently aim at sufficient conditions only. 'Moral intention', 'moral action' and 'moral ought' are supposed to be terms/expressions/notions of normal natural English speakers.)

 

'Moral intention'. That an intention is non-egoistically directed at the creation of a valuable state means (i.e., is sufficient) that it is a ‘moral’ intention. 

 

'Moral action'. That an action achieves a moral intention means that it is a ‘moral’ action.

 

'Ought'. If someone can do x, and is aware that doing x would advance the occurrence of a valuable state (e.g., by advancing the non-occurrence of a dis-valuable state), then she ‘ought to do’ x. 

 

'Moral ought'. If someone ought to do something which is not subject of her egoistic will, this means that she ‘morally’ ought to do it. 

 

[‘(Morally) ought to do’ is meant in the other-things-unconsidered sense. You ought not to cause the suffering of an innocent being, other things unconsidered. At the same time, if a doctor needs to cause suffering in an innocent person for the sake of healing, then considering this fact, she perhaps ought to do so.]
 

'Moral fact'. If someone morally ought to do something, or performs a moral action, or has a moral intention, this is a ‘moral fact’. 

 

Moral state. The existence of a moral facts is a 'moral state'.
 

 

 
Step 3 -- The existence of various moral entities

 

3.1 -- The existence of moral intentions and moral actions

 

According to the partial explication of ‘moral intention’ just given, to deny the existence of such intentions is to deny (among other things) the existence of any non-egoistic intentions directed at saving someone from pain, or depression, or terror, or to bring them happiness, or joy, or comfort or relief. It is hard to see how the occurrence of such events, every now and then at least, can plausibly be denied. Similarly implausible seems to be the denial of 'moral actions': if the partial explication just given is adequate, it requires just the success of a moral intention. 

 

3.2 -- The existence of 'ought' and moral 'ought'

 

According to the explication given above, and given the instances of valuable and dis-valuable states established, someone’s being aware that she could advance the occurrence of a valuable state (happiness, joy, etc.), or to prevent dis-valuable ones (suffering, pain, etc.) implies that she ought to act accordingly; insofar as the well-being of others is under consideration, she morally ought to act accordingly. If this is true, the existence of an ‘ought’, and even a ‘moral ought’, seems to be an event whose existence, every now and then at least, cannot plausibly be denied. 

 

 

 

Step 4 -- The truth of Moral Realism 

 

On the definition of ‘moral facts’ given above, the existence of either a moral intention, or a moral action, or a moral 'ought', is a moral fact, respectively. Given the apparent pervasiveness of these entities, we have strong reason to assume the truth of Moral Realism--the truth of Moral Realism is, as we might say, (epistemically) much more probable than its falsity.

 

 

 

Step 5 -- Qualifications required by determinism

 

Some (yet surprisingly few) philosophers find it hard to believe, given the presumption of an all-encompassing validity of the natural laws, that will is (at any time) free. Assuming that will is never free, some will find (the resultant variant of) Moral Realism to be somehow 'not genuine', or 'not full-blown'. Notice, however, that the idea of moral behaviour in the absence of free will has traditionally not been viewed as strictly inconsistent. Maybe we cannot decide freely: however, our actions can still be subdivided into morally good and bad ones.

A similar qualification concerns the existence of value states (states of value, dis-value): It may be asked if not determinism prevents the existence of value and dis-value. Can something be objectively valuable or dis-valuable when its occurrence is strictly unavoidable? (My intuition answers this question affirmatively.)